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ABSTRACT
Before adoption of Rule 707 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence,
North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 permitted a prosecutor to
introduce at a DUI trial a blood test report without testimony from the
person who tested the blood. Rule 707 was created to remedy this violation
of the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. When
originally adopted, the Rule merely required the prosecutor to give notice of
her intent to offer the blood test report, and the defendant could then
demand the prosecutor produce at trial the person who authored the report.
The Rule was later amended and now allows the defendant to identify the
persons he demands the prosecutor produce at trial to testify about the
report. The potential persons a defendant may demand now includes the
nurse who drew his blood, which is often burdensome on the State. This
Article focuses on the development of Rule 707 and its impact on DUI
prosecutions. The origin of Rule 707 – Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, –
is discussed in Part II. The adoption of the Rule is addressed in Part III.
Part IV outlines the amendment of the Rule. Part V discusses the impact of
the amendment on DUI prosecutions and suggestions to reduce the costs of
the amendment. Finally, Part VI restates the need for prosecutors to adapt
to the Rule.
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INTRODUCTION

Less than four years ago, the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts1 ruled a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses is violated when an analytical report is admitted
into evidence without affording the defendant a right to confront the author
of the report.2 At the time, several North Dakota statutes permitted what
Melendez-Diaz prohibited.3 In the DUI context, which this Article will
focus on, North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 permitted – without
testimony from the lab analyst – admission of an analytical report to show
the alcohol concentration of a driver’s blood.4
To remedy this
constitutional defect, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted North
Dakota Rule of Evidence 707.5 Rule 707 created a notice-and-demand
procedure endorsed in Melendez-Diaz.6 Under the procedure, a prosecutor
would serve written notice of the state’s intent to offer an analytical report
1. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
2. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
3. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37(5) (2009), 20.1-13.1-10(7), 20.1-15-11(9) (2012),
39-20-07(9), 39-24.1-08(7) (Supp. 2011).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (Supp. 2011).
5. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; North Dakota Supreme Court Order of Adoption No.
20090381 (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Order of Adoption No. 20090381], available at
http://www ndcourts.gov/court/Notices/20090381/Order htm.
6. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325-27; N.D. R. EVID. 707.
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showing the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood at the time of
driving.7 The defendant could then object by demanding the prosecutor
present at trial the analyst who tested the defendant’s blood sample.8
Since adoption, the North Dakota Supreme Court has amended Rule
707 to allow a defendant to identify the person he or she demands the
prosecution produce at trial.9 Under the existing rule, a defendant may
demand the prosecution produce the person who drew a defendant’s blood –
regardless of whether a law enforcement officer or other witness observed
the drawing of the blood and could testify precisely how it was drawn.10
Because the person who draws blood is often a registered nurse at a private
hospital,11 the amendment has been costly.
Following this brief introduction, Part II of this Article discusses the
origin of the Rule: Melendez-Diaz, a watershed Confrontation Clause case.
Part III covers the North Dakota Supreme Court’s adoption of Rule 707.
The amendment of the Rule – based on comments, Joint Procedure
Committee meetings, and, in large part, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
independent acts – is outlined in Part IV. Part V considers the impact of the
Rule on DUI prosecutions – primarily the defendant’s authority to demand
production of the nurse who drew a defendant’s blood – and suggests to
prosecutors some methods for dealing with its costs. Lastly, Part VI
restates the need for prosecutors to adapt to the Rule.
II. ORIGIN OF RULE 707: MELENDEZ-DIAZ AND NOTICE-ANDDEMAND STATUTES
In its order adopting North Dakota Rule of Evidence 707, the North
Dakota Supreme Court explained the Rule was a response to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.12 A review of
Melendez-Diaz thus provides the framework for Rule 707’s birth. In
Melendez-Diaz, police received a tip that Thomas Wright was behaving
suspiciously – repeatedly receiving phone calls at work; after each call,
going to the front of the store and getting picked up by a blue sedan; and
7. N.D. R. EVID. 707(a). For a “per se” violation of the DUI statute, the sample must be
obtained within two hours of a defendant’s operating or being in physical control of a vehicle.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 2011).
8. N.D. R. EVID. 707(b).
9. Id.; Joint Procedure Committee Minutes 10-13 (Sept. 23-24, 2010) [hereinafter Sept. 2010
Minutes].
10. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d 546, 553.
11. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, Fargo Police Dep’t (Dec. 7, 2012).
Sergeant Ahlfeldt estimated that he had taken DUI arrestees for blood tests approximately 450500 times during his career, and, in each case, the person who drew blood was a nurse.
12. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5.
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returning a short time later.13 Police set up surveillance and observed
Wright’s suspicious behavior.14 After Wright got out of the blue sedan
upon his return, an officer searched him and found four bags containing a
substance believed to be cocaine.15 Other officers then detained Luis
Melendez-Diaz, who was one of two men in the blue sedan.16 Officers put
Wright and the third man into a squad car.17 On the drive to the police
station, officers observed the suspects “fidgeting” and making suspicious
movements in the backseat of the squad car.18 Officers later searched the
squad car, and found a bag containing nineteen small plastic bags hidden
between the front and back seats.19 Those nineteen bags found in the car
and the four bags found in Wright’s possession were sent to a state lab for
testing.20
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine.21
At trial, the prosecutor offered as evidence state lab analysts’ certificates
showing the results of the testing of the bags.22 The certificates reported the
weight of the bags, and that the substance found in the bags was cocaine. 23
The certificates were sworn to, before a notary, by the analysts.24
Melendez-Diaz objected to the admission of the certificates, arguing his
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses required the analysts to
testify in person.25 Melendez-Diaz’s objection was overruled, and the
certificates were admitted.26 Melendez-Diaz was found guilty, and he
appealed.27 He argued admission of the certificates violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.28 After the state
appellate court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.29

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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At the outset, the Supreme Court identified the issue: whether the
analysts’ affidavits were “testimonial,” rendering the analysts witnesses
subject to the defendant’s right to confront under the Sixth Amendment.30
Citing Crawford v. Washington,31 the Court emphasized that the
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment “guarantees a defendant’s
right to confront those who bear testimony against him,” and a witness’s
testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness
appears at trial, or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.32
Explaining what is considered testimony (i.e., a testimonial statement)
under the Confrontation Clause, the Court reviewed the description it
previously gave:
Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements
exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent –
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect
to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.33
Using this description, the Court found the certificates were testimonial
statements.34 Indeed, the certificates were “quite plainly affidavits” and
“functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, ‘doing precisely what a

30. Id. at 307.
31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
32. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 310 (emphasis in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52
(2004)).
34. Id. After Melendez-Diaz, the Court encountered a similar issue in Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). The issue was whether the Confrontation Clause allows a
prosecutor to introduce a lab report containing a testimonial certification – made for purposes of
proving a DUI defendant’s blood alcohol concentration – through the courtroom testimony of a
scientist who did not certify, conduct, or observe the actual test reported in the certification. Id. at
2710. An analyst named Caylor tested Bullcoming’s blood and issued the certification of the
results. Id. at 2710-11. Caylor did not testify at trial, and instead another analyst testified about
Caylor’s certification. Id. at 2712. The Court reasoned that the right to confront is not satisfied
when a surrogate or substitute witness testifies about another’s statements. Id. at 2715-16. “In
short, when the State elected to introduce Caylor’s certification, Caylor became a witness
Bullcoming had the right to confront.” Id. at 2716.
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witness does on direct examination.’”35 As a result, the Court concluded
that unless the analysts were unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine them, the defendant was entitled to confront
the analysts at trial.36
Explaining the Sixth Amendment contemplates only two classes of
witnesses, the Court identified “[(1)] those against the defendant and [(2)]
those in his favor.”37 The prosecution must produce the latter (under the
Confrontation Clause), and the defendant may call the former (under the
Compulsory Process Clause).38 “[T]here is not a third category of
witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from
confrontation.”39
The Court, appropriately, indicated in an oft-cited footnote that even
chain of custody testimony offered by a prosecutor must be introduced live
if the defendant objects.40 Although the footnote’s first sentence is often
relied upon for the conclusion that chain of custody testimony is immune
from the Confrontation Clause, such a conclusion ignores the remainder of
the footnote. The first sentence provides, “we do not hold, and it is not the
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing chain of
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must
appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”41 However, that does
not mean testimonial42 statements from chain of custody witnesses are
admissible without in-court testimony. Indeed, the remaining sentences
clarify the first sentence.43 They show that “gaps in the chain [of custody]

35. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830
(2006)).
36. Id. at 311.
37. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 313-14.
39. Id. at 314.
40. Id. at 311 n.1.
41. Id.
42. When discussing chain of custody statements and what must be introduced live, the
Court focused on “testimony.” Id. Of course, while some chain of custody statements will be
testimonial, others will be nontestimonial. For instance, a person’s statements, on a form
expressly designated for use in a DUI case, that a blood sample was sent or received likely would
be testimonial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (providing “statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” are testimonial) (citations omitted).
On the other hand, regularly kept postal records showing that a package was mailed by a police
department to the state lab likely would be nontestimonial. See id.
43. The North Dakota Supreme Court has cited the footnote in several recent decisions. See
State ex rel. Madden v. Rustad, 2012 ND 242, ¶ 11, 837 N.W.2d 767, 771; State v. Lutz, 2012 ND
156, ¶ 9, 820 N.W.2d 111, 114; State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 9, 819 N.W.2d
546, 550; State v. Gietzen, 2010 ND 82, ¶ 3, 786 N.W.2d 1, 6-7.
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normally go to the weight of evidence rather than its admissibility[,]”44 and
that “[it] is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of
custody are so crucial as to require evidence . . . .”45 And most importantly,
“what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced
live.”46
Despite the prosecution’s duty to produce the witnesses47 offering
evidence against a defendant, the Court noted one exception:48 notice-anddemand statutes.49 Such statutes “require the prosecution to provide notice
to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial,
after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object
to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at
trial.”50 Justifying the exception, the Court indicated a defendant “always
44. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lolt,
854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)). The North Dakota Supreme Court has followed that principle.
See State v. Huffman, 542 N.W.2d 718, 721 (N.D. 1996) (“The State need not prove an ‘unbroken
chain of custody’ before physical evidence can be admitted at trial.”); State v. Haugen, 448
N.W.2d 191, 196 (N.D. 1989); State v. Bohe, 447 N.W.2d 277, 279 (N.D. 1989); State v.
Hartsoch, 329 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1983); see also State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 789
(N.D. 1982) (indicating the trial court “must be satisfied that, in all reasonable probability, the
item offered is the same as the item seized and is substantially unchanged in condition[,]” “that it
is reasonably probable that tampering or substitution did not occur[,]” and that “[c]ontrary
speculation may well affect the weight of the evidence accorded it by the factfinder but does not
affect its admissibility”); State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 540 (N.D. 1979); State v. Lange, 255
N.W.2d 59, 66 (N.D. 1977).
45. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1. The Court did distinguish from chain of custody
witnesses with testimonial evidence, “documents prepared in the regular course of equipment
maintenance [, which] may well qualify as nontestimonial records.” Id.
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
47. Three years after Melendez-Diaz, the Court gave instruction on who is considered a
witness in the context of DNA testing. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240 (2012).
The issue in Williams was whether the Confrontation Clause barred “an expert from expressing an
opinion based on facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the
expert is not competent to testify.” Id. at 2227. An expert testified that she produced a DNA
profile from a sample of the defendant’s blood that matched the profile that a separate lab
produced from semen found on vaginal swabs of the sexual assault victim, and no witness from
the separate lab testified. Id. at 2229-30. The Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause did
not bar the expert’s testimony for two independent reasons. Id. at 2228. First, the expert referred
to the separate lab report not to prove the truth of the matter in that report but to establish that the
report contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile developed from the defendant’s
blood. Id. at 2235, 2240 (recognizing that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted”).
Second, even if the separate lab report had been offered for its truth, it was not prepared for the
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual, i.e., a testimonial purpose. Id. at 2243.
48. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326. The Court did not characterize these statutes as an
“exception” to the rule requiring the prosecutor to produce at trial the witnesses against a
defendant. Id.
49. Id. at 325-27. The Court cited multiple examples of notice-and-demand statutes. Id. at
326-27 (referencing GA. CODE ANN § 35-3-154.1 (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., ART.
38.41, § 4 (Vernon 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(C) (Lexis 2006)); see also MINN.
STAT. § 634(15)(2)(b) (2012).
50. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.
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has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-anddemand statutes simply govern the time within which he must do so.”51
III. ADOPTION OF RULE 707
A few months after Melendez-Diaz was decided, the North Dakota
Supreme Court ordered that Rule 707 be adopted, effective February 1,
2010, subject to a comment period.52 In the adopting order, the court
reasoned “Melendez-Diaz held that analysts’ certificates of analysis were
testimonial statements, and the analysts [thus] were witnesses for Sixth
Amendment confrontation purposes[;]” that “a defendant’s ability to
subpoena the analyst under state law did not abrogate the state’s obligation
to produce the analyst for cross-examination[;]” and that the use of noticeand-demand statutes was acceptable.53 Furthermore, several statutes –
including North Dakota Century Code sections 19-03.1-37(5),54 20.1-13.110(7),55 20.1-15-11(9),56 39-20-07(9),57 and 39-24.1-08(7)58 – were

51. Id. at 327 (emphasis in original).
52. Order of Adoption, No. 20090381, supra note 5.
53. Id.
54. This subdivision relates to drug and drug paraphernalia prosecutions and provides that an
indigent defendant may subpoena “the director or an employee of the state crime laboratory . . . .”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-37(5) (2009). North Dakota Century Code subdivision 19-03.1-37(4)
would have violated a defendant’s right to confront. It provides that “a certified copy of the
analytical report signed by the director or the director’s designee must be accepted as prima facie
evidence of the results of the analytical findings.” Id. § 19-03.1-37(4). Providing an indigent
defendant the ability to subpoena a state crime laboratory employee could coexist with a noticeand-demand statute. For instance, a defendant could decide after his demand deadline that he
wished to question an analyst or he could strategically believe that it would be more persuasive, to
present the evidence through a state criminal laboratory employee rather than during crossexamination of the employee.
55. This subdivision relates to operating a boat while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
and provides that an indigent defendant may subpoena “the individual who conducted the
chemical test” to determine the alcohol or drug concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or
urine. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-13.1-10(7), 20.1-13.1-01 (2012) (outlining the purpose of
testing under N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 20.1-13.1 and identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested).
North Dakota Century Code subdivision 20.1-13.1-10(3) would have violated a defendant’s right
to confront. It provides that “[t]he results of the chemical test must be received in evidence when
it is shown that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .” Id. §
20.1-13.1-10(3). Subdivision 6 – which provides that a certified copy of the analytical report must
be accepted as prima facie evidence – would have also violated a defendant’s right to confront.
Id. § 20.1-13.1-10(6).
56. This subdivision relates to hunting while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and
provides that an indigent defendant may subpoena “the individual who conducted the chemical
test” to determine the alcohol or drug concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-15-11(9), 20.1-15-01 (outlining the purpose of testing under N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 20.1-15 and identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested). North Dakota
Century Code subdivision 20.1-15-11(5) would have violated a defendant’s right to confront. It
provides that “[t]he results of the chemical test must be received in evidence when it is shown that
the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .” Id. § 20.1-15-11(5).
Subdivision 8 – which provides that a certified copy of the analytical report must be accepted as
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constitutionally suspect, because they merely allowed a defendant to
subpoena an analyst but did not require the state to produce the analyst to
testify.59
To remedy the constitutional concerns, the Rule provided a notice-anddemand procedure.60 The prosecution, accordingly, had to give notice of its
intent to offer at trial an analytical report under any of the statutes.61 If the
prima facie evidence – would have also violated a defendant’s right to confront. Id. § 20.1-1511(8).
57. This subdivision relates to DUI prosecutions and provides that an indigent defendant may
subpoena “the individual who conducted the chemical analysis” to determine the alcohol or drug
concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-20-07(9), 3920-01 (Supp. 2011) (outlining the purpose of testing under N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-20 and
identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested). North Dakota Century Code subdivision 39-2007(5) would have violated a defendant’s right to confront. It provides that “[t]he results of the
chemical analysis must be received in evidence when it is shown that the sample was properly
obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .” Subdivision 8 – which provides that a certified
copy of the analytical report must be accepted as prima facie evidence – would have also violated
a defendant’s right to confront. Id. § 39-20-07(8).
58. This subdivision relates to snowmobiling while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
and provides that an indigent defendant may subpoena “the individual who conducted the
chemical test” to determine the alcohol or drug concentration of the defendant’s blood, breath, or
urine. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-24.1-08(7), 39-24.1-01 (outlining the purpose of testing under
N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-24.1 and identifying the bodily fluids that can be tested). North Dakota
Century Code subdivision 39-24.1-08(3) would have violated a defendant’s right to confront. It
provides that “[t]he results of the chemical test must be received in evidence when it is shown that
the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered . . . .” Id. § 39-24.1-08(3).
Subdivision 6 – which provides that a certified copy of the analytical report must be accepted as
prima facie evidence – would have also violated a defendant’s right to confront. Id. § 39-24.108(6).
59. Id.
60. The full text of the originally adopted rule was as follows:
RULE 707. ANALYTICAL REPORT ADMISSION;
CONFRONTATION
(a) Notification to Defendant. If the prosecution intends to introduce an analytical
report issued under N.D.C.C. chapters 19-03.1, 19-03.2, 19-03.4, 20.1-13.1, 20.1-15,
39-06.2, or 39-20 in a criminal trial, it must notify the defendant or the defendant's
attorney of its intent to introduce the report at least 30 days before the trial.
(b) Objection. At least 10 days before the trial, the defendant may object in writing to
the introduction of the report. If objection is made, the prosecutor must produce the
person who prepared the report to testify at the trial. If the witness is not available to
testify, the court must grant a continuance.
(c) Waiver. If the defendant does not timely object to the introduction of the report,
the defendant's right to confront the person who prepared the report is waived and the
report, if otherwise admissible, must be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results
contained in the report.
N.D. R. EVID. 707(a) (2010), available at http://www ndcourts.gov/court/Notices/20090381/
Rule707.ev htm.
61. Id.
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defendant timely objected, the prosecution would have to produce “the
person who prepared the report” to testify at trial.62 For analytical tests
conducted at the North Dakota State Crime Lab, the person who prepared
the report was, and continues to be, the analyst who tested the sample at
issue.63 So under the originally adopted rule, the only person that a
defendant could demand produced for trial was the analyst who tested the
sample.64
IV. AMENDMENT OF RULE 707
When the Rule was originally adopted, the North Dakota Supreme
Court ordered it “effective February 1, 2010, subject to a comment
period.”65 Comments were due one month later.66 Attorney Tom Tuntland
submitted comments and raised concerns “in two principal areas, namely
timing and modification of substantive law.”67 Emphasizing the Rule only
required the prosecution to give thirty days’ notice of its intent to offer an
analytical report, Tuntland asserted the Rule would force a defendant to
choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to confront the
analyst.68 Thus he recommended the deadline for the prosecution’s notice
be changed to an earlier date.69 Tuntland also recommended the Rule be
amended to omit the language indicating the “unobjected to” report must be
accepted as prima facie evidence of the results.70 Tuntland argued the Rule
should address only the admissibility of the analytical report, not the effect
(prima facie evidence) of the report.71
Besides Tuntland, the North Dakota Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NDACDL) submitted comments.72 The NDACDL indicated its
concerns about the Rule were threefold: “(1) it appears to procedurally and
substantively favor the State; (2) it was not subjected to the normal judicial

62. Id.
63. Telephone Interview with Hope Olson, Dir., Crime Lab. Div., Office of Attorney Gen.
(Nov. 29, 2012).
64. See N.D. R. EVID. 707(b) (2010).
65. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5.
66. Id.
67. E-mail from Tom Tuntland, J.D., to Andrew Forward, J.D., Office of Clerk of N.D.
Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 2010) (on file with author).
68. Id.
69. Id. Tuntland suggested using the same deadline as the one for pre-trial motions. Id.
70. Id. (referencing N.D. R. EVID. 707(c) (2010)).
71. Id.
72. Letter from Michael R. Hoffman, President, N.D. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, to
Penny L. Miller, Clerk of the Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 2010) (on file with author). Hoffman
signed the letter containing the comments, and forty-seven other lawyers, including Tuntland,
electronically endorsed the letter. Id.
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rulemaking process; and (3) it raises substantive, constitutional concerns
under the Sixth Amendment.”73 Outlining its first concern, the NDACDL
pointed out that the Rule did not require the prosecution to provide its
notice in writing and did not establish a remedy if the prosecution failed to
provide proper notice.74 The NDACL, like Tuntland, also asserted the Rule
would unfairly establish the analytical report results as prima facie
evidence, and infringe on defendants’ rights to a speedy trial.75 On its
second concern, the NDACDL emphasized that the Rule was adopted by
the court sua sponte without input from the Joint Procedure Committee.76
The NDACDL recommended the Joint Procedure Committee be involved in
the process of adopting the Rule.77 Addressing its third concern, the
NDACDL indicated its concern “can be simplified [to] stating that
‘subpoena statutes’ or ‘notice-and-demand statutes’ improperly circumvent
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses in a criminal trial.”78
The NDACDL’s and Tuntland’s comments were the only ones
submitted during the comment period. Based on the comments, the North
Dakota Supreme Court proposed amendments to the Rule. The proposed
amendments required the prosecution’s notice to be in writing and
eliminated the prima facie effect of admission of the analytical report.79
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Two attorneys, Robert G. Hoy and Bruce D. Quick, electronically endorsed the
NDACDL comments and were also members of the Joint Procedure Committee. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The NDACDL cited Melendez-Diaz but argued its principles on notice-and-demand
statutes were dicta. Id.
79. The proposed amendments, in their entirety, were as follows:
RULE 707. ANALYTICAL REPORT ADMISSION;
CONFRONTATION
(a) Notification to Defendant. If the prosecution intends to introduce an analytical
report issued under N.D.C.C. chapters chs. 19-03.1, 19-03.2, 19-03.4, 20.1-13.1, 20.115, 39-06.2, or 39-20 in a criminal trial, it must notify the defendant or the defendant's
attorney in writing of its intent to introduce the report at least 30 days before the trial.
The prosecution must also serve a copy of the report on the defendant or the
defendant's attorney.
(b) Objection. At least 10 14 days before the trial, the defendant may object in writing
to the introduction of the report. If objection is made, the prosecutor must produce the
person who prepared the report to testify at the trial. If the witness is not available to
testify, the court must grant a continuance.
(c) Waiver. If the defendant does not timely object to the introduction of the report,
the defendant's right to confront the person who prepared the report is waived and the
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The court also requested that the Joint Procedure Committee review the
proposed amendments.80
At its September 2010 meeting, the Joint Procedure Committee
reviewed the proposed amendments,81 which the committee later adopted.82
The committee also recommended two additional amendments: (1) ensure
the Rule applied not just to criminal trials but also to juvenile delinquency
proceedings83 and (2) require the prosecution to serve the analytical report
at least thirty days before trial.84 At one point, a committee member
commented “the state may be required to produce multiple witnesses in
some cases, as defense attorneys have argued that everyone involved with
filling out the report should be made available for cross examination.”85
But neither that member nor any other member recommended changing the
provision requiring the prosecutor to produce “the person who prepared the
report . . . .”86
Three months after the Joint Procedure Committee meeting, the North
Dakota Supreme Court also ordered the adoption of the committee’s
proposed amendments, with some changes by the court, effective March 1,
2011.87 The court’s further amendments included significant ones to the
objection section – adding the defendant’s power to identify the witness to
testify about the analytical report and, accordingly, changing the
prosecution’s duty to produce the person identified, rather than the person
who prepared the report.88 The amended objection section thus provided
that “the defendant may object in writing to the introduction of the report
and identify the name or job title of the witness to be produced to testify

report, if otherwise admissible, must be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results
contained in the report.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 707 OF THE NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF EVIDENCE,
http://www ndcourts.gov/court/JP/Agendas/Sep2010/Rule.707.ev htm [hereinafter Amendments
Rule 707].
80. Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 9, at 10.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 12. The specific recommendation was to amend section (a) by adding “or juvenile
delinquency proceeding” after the existing phrase “criminal trial.” Id.
84. Id. at 12-13. The specific recommendation was to amend section (a) by adding the
phrase “must also serve a copy of the report on the defendant or the defendant’s attorney” after the
existing phrase “intent to introduce the report.” Id.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 10-13; Amendments Rule 707, supra note 79.
87. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, http://www ndcourts.gov/court/Notices/20090381/
order2 htm [hereinafter Amended Order of Adoption No. 20090381].
88. Id.
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about the report at trial” and “[i]f objection is made, the prosecutor must
produce the person requested.”89
V. IMPACT OF AMENDMENT ON DUI PROSECUTIONS
The amendments to Rule 707 have been costly on DUI prosecutions in
one major way: requiring the prosecution to produce at trial the person who
drew a defendant’s blood90 – often a registered nurse from a private
hospital.91
First, this Part provides some background about DUI
prosecutions to help illustrate the impact of Melendez-Diaz and Rule 707.
After generally explaining DUI prosecutions in North Dakota, Section B of
this Part explains the process of DUI prosecutions prior to the court creating
and amending Rule 707. Section C explains the process after the
amendments, leading to the increased costs explained in Section D. Finally,
Section E provides several solutions to reduce the costliness of DUI
prosecution in North Dakota.
A. DUI PROSECUTIONS GENERALLY
In a DUI prosecution in North Dakota, proving the alcohol
concentration in a driver’s body is very important.92 Indeed, unless the
prosecution relies on a “non per se” provision93 (i.e., a driver was simply
too impaired to drive safely), an alcohol concentration of at least .08% (a
“per se” violation) is an essential element that must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.94 An alcohol concentration is determined by obtaining a
defendant’s blood or breath sample.95 When a blood sample is sought,96 a
law enforcement officer typically takes an arrestee to a hospital and seeks
an individual medically qualified to draw blood.97 That individual is often a
89. N.D. R. EVID. 707(b) (2011).
90. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d 546, 553.
91. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, supra note 11.
92. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1)(a) (Supp. 2011).
93. “Non per se” provisions prohibit a person from driving when he is “under the influence
of intoxicating liquor[,]” when he is “under the influence of any drug or substance or combination
of drugs or substances to a degree which renders [him] incapable of safely driving[,]” and when he
is “under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drugs or substances to a degree which
render [him] incapable of safely driving.” See id. § 39-08-01(1)(b)-(d).
94. Id. § 39-08-01(1)(a).
95. See id. § 39-20-01 (identifying potential chemical tests of “the blood, breath, or urine”).
Although the statute provides for the testing of urine, the state crime lab rarely conducts tests to
determine the alcohol concentration from urine. Telephone Interview with Charles E. Eder, N.D.
State Toxicologist (Dec. 21, 2012).
96. The officer has discretion to choose whether a blood, breath, or urine sample is sought.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01.
97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (“The director of the state crime laboratory or the
director’s designee shall determine the qualifications or credentials for being medically qualified
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nurse.98 For sake of efficiency in this Article, “nurse” will be used
interchangeably with “individual medically qualified to draw blood.”
In drawing blood, the nurse should99 follow an approved method100 – a
procedure designated by the state toxicologist.101 The approved method is
set out in a document entitled “Form 104.”102 It provides the following
checklist for the nurse as specimen collector: “used an intact kit; observed
powder in vacutainer tube; used disinfectant provided in kit; used needle,
guide and tube provided in kit; [and] drew blood into tube and inverted
several times.”103 As the nurse draws blood, the officer is present104 and
usually observes as the nurse draws the blood.105 Once the nurse has drawn
the blood, the officer follows Form 104’s approved method for packaging it
and sends it to the state lab for testing.106
to draw blood, and shall issue a list of approved designations including medical doctor and
registered nurse.”). The state toxicologist, as the state crime laboratory director’s designee, lists
the approved designations of individuals medically qualified to draw blood as follows: clinical
laboratory scientist, clinical laboratory technician, medical doctor, medical laboratory scientist,
medical laboratory technician, medical technician, nurse practitioner, osteopathic physician and
surgeon, physician assistant, certified physician assistant, registered nurse, and other designations
covered in North Dakota Century Code section 43-17-01 of the “Physicians and Surgeons”
chapter. Aff. of Charles E. Eder, N.D. State Toxicologist (Sept. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.ag nd.gov/CrimeLab/BloodAlcoholProgram/MeciallyQualIndviduals/09-29-11.pdf.
98. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, supra note 11.
99. If the nurse does not follow the approved method, expert testimony may be used to show
the blood test was still accurate. See infra discussion Part V.E.
100. The “approved method” is the term used for the scientific processes designated by the
state crime lab director or the director’s designee for analyzing samples. Telephone Interview
with Mark A. Friese, Attorney-At-Law, Vogel Law Firm (Mar. 21, 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3920-07(5). The term, though, has been sometimes expanded to include other designated
procedures. See City of West Fargo v. Hawkins, 200 ND 168, ¶ 3, 616 N.W.2d 856, 857 (noting a
registered nurse “had drawn the blood in accordance with the State Toxicologist’s approved
method”); State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D. 1993) (referring to a blood sample
“drawn according to the method approved by the State Toxicologist”). This Article uses the
expanded definition of “approved method” to include the state toxicologist’s designated
procedures for nonscientific processes.
101. The state toxicologist acts as the state crime laboratory director’s designee. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(5).
102. See State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D. 1988) (explaining the state
toxicologist “drafted From 104 to be used when a blood sample is drawn for blood alcohol
testing”).
103. Submission for Blood (104) (capitalization and boxes omitted).
104. Telephone Interview with Sergeant William Ahlfeldt, supra note 11. Because the
defendant has been arrested and is considered a prisoner, the officer must ensure that the
defendant is kept in law enforcement’s custody. Id.
105. Id.
106. The state toxicologist provides the following checklist as the approved method for the
specimen submitter:
used an intact kit; affixed completed specimen label/seal over the top and down the
sides of the blood tube; placed the blood tube inside the blood tube protector and then
place it in the plastic bag provided (do not remove liquid absorbing sheet); placed the
plastic bag and completed top portion of this form in the kit box and closed it; [and]
affixed tamper-evident kit box shipping seal on kit box.
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After testing, North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 provides a
streamlined process – often referred to as the “shortcut”107 – for admission
of the results into evidence. Using the shortcut, the prosecutor must show
that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly
administered.108 Form 104 can be used to show “fair administration, chain
of custody, and compliance with the State Toxicologist’s approved
methods.”109 In addition to providing the approved methods for the nurse to
draw blood and the officer to package it, Form 104 includes sections for the
officer, the nurse, and the “specimen receiver” (an intake person at the state
lab) to complete.110 The nurse’s section of Form 104 contains space for the
time and date the blood was obtained, and for other remarks.111 It also has a
space where the nurse signs and certifies the nurse “withdrew the blood
specimen from the [defendant] and the information in this section is true
and correct.”112
B. DUI PROSECUTIONS PRE-AMENDMENT
Before the amendments to Rule 707, DUI prosecutions remained
relatively streamlined – with or without Form 104. The North Dakota
Supreme Court repeatedly recognized that an officer’s testimony could
overcome the failure to introduce a complete Form 104.113
In Schlosser v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,114 the
court encountered a case involving a “failure to introduce Form 104 into
Submission for Blood (104) (capitalization and boxes omitted).
107. State ex rel. Madden v. Rustad, 2012 ND 242, ¶ 11, 837 N.W.2d 767, 773; State v.
Lutz, 2012 ND 156, ¶ 13, 820 N.W.2d 111, 116; Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND
173, ¶ 10, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698.
108. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 12, 819 N.W.2d 546, 552 (citing
Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698). The prosecutor
must also show that the method and devices used in testing the sample were approved by the state
toxicologist and that the blood test was performed by an authorized person. Id. (citing Schlosser
v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698).
109. State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D. 1993).
110. See Submission for Blood (Form 104); State Form No. 50491 (Mar. 2009).
111. Submission for Blood (Form 104).
112. Id.; see also State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, ¶ 3, 735 N.W.2d 848, 849-50 (providing that
on Form 104, the nurse “marked that she used an intact blood sample kit; used the disinfectant,
needle, guide, and blood tube provided in the blood sample kit; observed powder in the blood
tube; and drew blood into the blood tube and inverted the blood tube several times[;] . . . recorded
the date and time she drew [the defendant’s] blood and signed the form”).
113. See Friedt, ¶¶ 11-13, 735 N.W.2d at 849-55; Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009
ND 173, ¶¶ 11-13, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698-99; State v. Skarsgard, 2007 ND 160, ¶¶ 12-13, 739
N.W.2d 786, 792; Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d at 881; McNamara v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 500
N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D. 1993).
114. 2009 ND 173, 775 N.W.2d 695. Although Schlosser was not a criminal case, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has recently relied on it in criminal cases. See State ex rel. Roseland v.
Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 14, 819 N.W.2d 546, 552-93.
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evidence.”115 The court explained that “[w]hile introducing Form 104 is a
shortcut to show fair administration, chain of custody, and compliance with
the approved method, this Court has previously allowed an officer’s
testimony to overcome the failure to introduce a complete Form 104.”116
The court reviewed the officer’s testimony.117 Characterizing it as
“conclusory and perfunctory,” the court indicated the officer failed to
establish that he and the nurse followed all the steps listed on Form 104
while collecting a blood sample from a DUI arrestee.118 At the end of its
opinion, the court again summarized that “[w]hile testimony can overcome
the failure to submit a completed Form 104, the testimony in this case is
insufficient.”119
In State v. Jordheim,120 the court indicated that an officer’s testimony
can be used to establish that the approved method in Form 104 was
followed.121 The bottom half of Form 104 (the specimen submitter section)
was not offered by the prosecution in Jordheim.122 But the officer who
arrested the defendant for DUI testified that he performed the steps set out
on Form 104.123 The court explained “this testimony, coupled with the
documentary exhibits, established fair administration through scrupulous
compliance with Form 104.”124
In State v. Friedt,125 the court rejected a defendant’s contention that the
prosecution must produce at trial the nurse who drew the defendant’s
blood.126 Instead, the court ruled that the prosecution could rely upon a law
enforcement officer who observed the nurse draw the blood.127 The court
emphasized that the officer “personally observed the blood draw by the
registered nurse, and based on his personal observations, he was able to
testify how [the defendant’s] blood was obtained.”128
The court,
accordingly, concluded that the officer’s testimony “showed that [the
defendant’s] blood was properly obtained[.]”129 The ruling in Friedt,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Schlosser, ¶ 1, 775 N.W.2d at 696.
Id. ¶ 11, 775 N.W.2d at 699.
Id. ¶ 3, 775 N.W.2d at 696-97.
Id. ¶ 13, 775 N.W.2d at 699.
Id.
508 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1993).
Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing McNamara v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 500 N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D. 1993)).
2007 ND 108, 735 N.W.2d 848.
Friedt, ¶¶ 11-13, 735 N.W.2d at 849-55.
Id. ¶ 13, 735 N.W.2d at 855.
Id.
Id.
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however, went further. Indeed, the court indicated that the officer’s
testimony “laid the foundation for the admission of Form 104[,]” which, of
course, included the nurse’s statements.130
Repeatedly citing Friedt, the court in State v. Gietzen131 again rejected
a defendant’s contention that the prosecution must produce at trial the nurse
who drew the defendant’s blood.132 Unlike Friedt, the officer in Gietzen
did not establish that the nurse properly obtained the defendant’s blood.133
So the court had to look elsewhere for “the foundation for [the defendant’s]
chemical analysis . . . .”134 The court turned to Form 104.135 Emphasizing
the streamlined procedure under North Dakota Century Code section 39-2007(5), the court concluded that Form 104 established that the defendant’s
blood sample was properly obtained.136
In making its conclusion, the court rejected the defendant’s argument
that his right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Form 104,
because he was not allowed to cross-examine the nurse whose statements
were included in the form.137 The court viewed Melendez-Diaz as
clarifying a defendant’s right to confront merely lab analysts.138 The court
cited the famous footnote in Melendez-Diaz, which indicates the Court was
not holding that “anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing
the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing
device must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”139 The
court reasoned that the statements of the nurse “fall squarely within
footnote one because they serve the evidentiary function of establishing the
propriety of [the defendant’s] blood draw, not the conclusory function of
establishing [the defendant’s] blood-alcohol concentration . . . .”140 Under
this reasoning, evidence providing foundation for admission of the lab
results was not testimonial, while evidence directly proving an element of a
crime was testimonial.141

130. Id.
131. 2010 ND 82, 786 N.W.2d 1.
132. Gietzen, ¶¶ 13-18, 786 N.W.2d at 5-7.
133. Id. ¶ 15, 786 N.W.2d at 5-6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 18, 786 N.W.2d at 7.
137. Id. ¶ 16, 786 N.W.2d at 6.
138. Id. ¶ 17.
139. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009)).
140. Id. This reasoning was supported by case law in other jurisdictions.
Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 921 N.E.2d 968, 975 n.15 (Mass. 2010).
141. Lutz, 2012 ND 156, 820 N.W.2d 111; Rustad, 2012 ND 424, 837 N.W.2d 767.
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C. DUI PROSECUTIONS POST-AMENDMENT
After Rule 707 was amended, three cases sprung up. Two limited the
persons whom the prosecution needed to produce at trial. In one, State ex
rel. Madden v. Rustad,142 the court ruled a defendant could not require the
prosecutor produce at trial the State Crime Lab Director.143 The court
explained that no provision required the Director to make testimonial
statements in the prima facie evidence authorized under the shortcuts of
North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 and that the Director’s
anticipated testimony would not prove the blood sample was properly
drawn or the “substance of the results of the analytical report . . . .”144
In the other case, State v. Lutz,145 the court concluded that the
prosecution need not produce either the analyst who prepared the volatiles
solution used by another analyst in conducting the chemical test or mail
carriers or evidence custodians involved in transporting or maintaining a
sample.146 Noting that “documents prepared in the regular course of
equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records[,]” the
court explained that the statements of the volatiles solution preparer were
not prepared in anticipation of trial and thus were not testimonial.147
Further, “the prosecution is not required to produce all individuals who laid
hands on the evidence [i.e., mail carriers and evidence custodians] when
establishing the chain of custody.”148 Lutz, though, also required the
prosecution to produce at trial a witness other than the analyst. In doing so,
the court relied on the third149 Rule 707 case – State ex rel. Roseland v.
Herauf150 – which was the most detrimental to prosecutors.
The defendant in Herauf was arrested for DUI and submitted to a blood
draw by a nurse.151 The prosecutor gave notice under Rule 707 that he
142. 2012 ND 242, 823 N.W.2d 767.
143. Rustad, ¶¶ 17, 19, 823 N.W.2d at 773.
144. Id. ¶ 17.
145. 2012 ND 156, 820 N.W.2d 111.
146. Lutz, ¶¶ 7-12, 820 N.W.2d at 117-19.
147. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 820 N.W.2d at 117 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
311 n.1 (2009)). The court also noted that the prosecution was not intending to introduce the
statements of the volatiles solution preparer. Id. ¶ 8, 820 N.W.2d at 117-19.
148. Id. ¶ 12, 820 N.W.2d at 119 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311
n.1 (2009)). It is unclear whether Form 104 and the specimen receiver’s statements contained in it
were challenged. If so, admission of Form 104 without testimony from the specimen receiver
likely would violate the defendant’s right to confront. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 311 n.1 (2009). Indeed, the prosecutor could choose to forgo chain-of-custody evidence, but
“what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live.” Id.
149. “Third” is meant as the last to be discussed in this Article, not the last in time
chronologically. Herauf was actually decided before Lutz and Rustad.
150. 2012 ND 151, 819 N.W.2d 546.
151. Herauf, ¶ 2, 819 N.W.2d at 548.
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intended to introduce at trial the analytical report showing the results from
testing of the defendant’s blood.152 The defendant responded by sending
the prosecutor a subpoena to serve upon the nurse who drew the
defendant’s blood.153 The prosecutor moved to quash the subpoena.154 The
district court denied the motion and ordered that the prosecutor must
produce the nurse at trial.155
The prosecutor then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a
writ directing the district court to withdraw its order.156 The prosecutor
argued that the plain language of Rule 707 only requires the production of
witnesses to testify “about the [analytical] report,” which the nurse knew
nothing about;157 that the nurse was unnecessary for confrontation because
an officer observed the nurse draw blood and would testify, thereby
establishing the blood was properly obtained;158 and that even if the officer
could not establish that the nurse followed the approved method in drawing
the defendant’s blood, fair administration could be proven through expert
testimony.159
In considering the petition, the court160 reasoned that because Rule 707
references North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20, it “must be
interpreted in light of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07, which governs the admission of
analytical reports . . . .”161 The court explained that “the legislature
intertwined analytical reports and blood draws within N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07,
requiring us to include blood draws, as well as analytical reports, in our
interpretation of [Rule] 707.”162
The court then reviewed North Dakota Century Code section 39-2007(10), which provides:
A signed statement from the individual medically qualified to
draw the blood sample for testing as set forth in subsection 5 is

546.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1.
Brief for Petitioner ¶ 30, State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, 819 N.W.2d

158. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, ¶ 31 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305 (2009); State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, ¶¶ 12-13, 735 N.W.2d 848, 853-55).
159. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, ¶ 31 n.2 (quoting State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d
317, 324 (N.D. 1988)).
160. The court’s majority included Chief Justice VandeWalle, Justice Kapsner, and Justice
Maring. Herauf, ¶ 20, 819 N.W.2d at 555. Justice Sandtrom concurred and Justice Crothers
dissented. Id. ¶¶ 20, 28, 819 N.W.2d at 555, 557.
161. Id. ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d at 551.
162. Id.
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prima facie evidence that the blood sample was properly drawn
and no further foundation for the admission of this evidence may
be required.163
Citing Schlosser, the court concluded that “under the statute, a prerequisite
to admission of an analytical report is a signed statement from the
individual medically qualified to draw the blood sample that the blood
sample was properly drawn.”164 That conclusion paved the way for the
court’s ultimate ruling.
Indeed, if the officer’s testimony about observing the specific method
followed by the nurse in drawing blood was sufficient to show the blood
sample was properly drawn, no Sixth Amendment issue would exist. The
prosecutor could choose to forgo presenting the nurse’s statement and any
testimony from her. But the court’s conclusion ensured that the nurse was
necessary; the nurse’s signed statement is obviously testimonial.165 And so
came the court’s ultimate ruling: Rule 707 requires the prosecutor to
produce at trial the individual who drew the defendant’s blood if the
defendant objects and demands that the individual be produced.166 The
court further announced that “[t]o the extent our previous cases, such as
Gietzen . . . and Friedt . . . are inconsistent with our holding today, they are
overruled.”167
Gietzen and Friedt each had flaws, namely, allowing admission of the
blood drawing nurse’s statements in Form 104 without testimony from the
nurse.168 Yet Friedt’s principle that an officer’s testimony could establish –
based on his personal observations – that a nurse properly obtained blood
did not need correcting.169
In fact, “correcting” Friedt required
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07(10) (Supp. 2011).
164. Herauf, ¶ 14, 819 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND
173, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698).
165. Id. ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d at 553. The court noted that the Nebraska Supreme Court recently
ruled that a defendant’s right to confrontation was violated when the certificate of the nurse who
drew the defendant’s blood was admitted at trial without the nurse’s testimony. Id. ¶ 17, 819
N.W.2d at 554-55 (citing State v. Sorenson, 814 N.W.2d 371 (Neb. 2012)). The court did not cite
Sorenson for the conclusion that the nurse’s statement is a prerequisite to show that the blood
sample was properly drawn. Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 819 N.W.2d at 553-55. On that point, a key distinction
exists between Herauf and Sorenson: In Herauf, the prosecutor had no intent to offer the nurse’s
statement, while in Sorenson, the prosecutor relied exclusively on the nurse’s certificate. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 157, ¶¶ 30-31; State v. Sorenson, 814 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Neb. 2012)).
166. Herauf, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d at 553 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 311 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)).
167. Herauf, ¶ 15, 819 N.W.2d at 553 (citing State v. Gietzen, 2010 ND 82, 786 N.W.2d 1;
State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, 735 N.W.2d 848).
168. State v. Gietzen, 2010 ND 82, ¶¶ 16-18, 786 N.W.2d 1, 5-7; State v. Friedt, 2007 ND
108, ¶ 13, 735 N.W.2d 848, 855.
169. An officer testifying about his personal observations does not trigger confrontation
issues. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (showing that the
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manipulating Schlosser. As noted in Herauf, the court cited Schlosser to
support its conclusion that the nurse’s statement is a prerequisite to show a
blood sample was properly obtained.170 But in Schlosser, the court
explained that an officer’s testimony can be a sufficient substitute for the
nurse’s statement.171 Indeed, the court in Schlosser twice recognized that
an officer’s testimony could “overcome the failure to introduce a complete
Form 104.”172 And the court actually reviewed the officer’s testimony to
determine whether it was sufficient to show that the steps in Form 104 were
followed and, accordingly, that the sample was properly obtained.173
Simply put, Schlosser established that Form 104 (i.e., a document with a
nurse’s statement)174 was not a prerequisite to show a blood sample was
properly obtained.175 Herauf thus recharachterized Schlosser.
D. COSTS OF AMENDMENT
Herauf’s recharachterization of Schlosser was costly. By establishing
the nurse as a necessary witness, the Rule pits prosecutors against private
hospitals for a high demand resource: nurses. The competition is
exacerbated by the large number of DUI blood draws. In 2012, the state
crime lab in North Dakota will analyze approximately five thousand blood
samples.176 For each sample, a nurse or other medically qualified
individual drew blood.177 That means many potential trial subpoenas for
nurses. Of course, many DUI cases end in guilty pleas.178 But many of
those cases first get set for trial, and prosecutors then issue subpoenas for

Confrontation Clause is implicated by testimonial statements not by a witness’s observations of
another’s conduct).
170. Herauf, ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d at 551.
171. Schlosser v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 11, 775 N.W.2d 695, 698-99.
172. Id. ¶ 11, 775 N.W.2d at 699.
173. Id. ¶ 3, 775 N.W.2d at 696-97.
174. Form 104 includes the nurse’s statement. See supra discussion Part IV.A.
175. Schlosser, ¶¶ 11-13, 775 N.W.2d at 698-99. Some argue that even if an officer
observed the nurse and thus can testify that the nurse followed the approved method in drawing
blood, the nurse is still needed to establish that she is a nurse (i.e., a person medically qualified to
draw blood). Even assuming that the premise is true (that the officer cannot testify that the nurse
is a nurse), nontestimonial documents certainly could establish the nurse’s occupation. For
instance, a hospital business record or roster would not lead someone to reasonably believe “that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 52 (2004).
176. E-mail from Hope R. Olson, supra note 63. Crime Lab statistics through December 6,
2012, showed 4859 blood alcohol cases (categorized as including both “traffic and non-highway
safety”) were submitted. Id.
177. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (Supp. 2011).
178. It should be noted that some of the five thousand blood draws likely did not result in
continued DUI prosecution. For instance, if the test result showed an alcohol concentration below
.08%, a DUI conviction would be unlikely.
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nurses.179 When nurses receive subpoenas, employers (hospitals) plan their
schedules for potential trials. This disrupts hospital business.
Indeed, within three months of Herauf, Saint Alexius Medical Center
(SAMC) – a major provider serving Burleigh and Morton Counties – gave
notice that as of 2013, it will no longer offer blood draw services. 180
SAMC cited the requirement that the prosecution now “produce at trial the
nurse who drew the blood sample” and the fact that its nurses were
currently doing fifty blood alcohol draws per month.181 SAMC explained it
“does not have the ability to adequately staff the ER as required to meet the
ever increasing needs for quality patient care and responding to court
appearances required by subpoenas.”182 Sanford Health in Bismarck has
also advised law enforcement that it will no longer provide blood draw
services.183 And those advisories have been effective immediately.184
Other counties are concerned about Sanford and SAMC-like responses.
In Ward,185 Wells,186 McHenry,187 and Cass188 Counties, prosecutors fear
that hospitals will opt out of the blood-drawing business. Understaffed
hospitals striving for maximum efficiency may simply decide, as SAMC
and Sanford did, that providing blood drawing services – with the
accompanying subpoenas and potential court appearances – now
undermines that goal.189
Prosecutors have concerns beyond the fear of hospitals choosing not to
offer blood draw services. The burden of producing nurses for trial is one
concern. While hospitals have been cooperative thus far in Fargo,
179. Interview with Assistant Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney Tristan J. Van de Streek, in Fargo,
N.D. (Dec. 14, 2012).
180. Letter from Amy J. Hornbacher, Vice President, Corporate Compliance/Risk
Management, St. Alexius Medical Ctr., to Burleigh Cnty. State’s Attorney (Oct. 22, 2012)
[hereinafter Amy J. Hornbacher Burleigh Cnty. Letter] (on file with author); Letter from Amy J.
Hornbacher, Vice President, Corporate Compliance/Risk Management, St. Alexius Medical Ctr.,
to Ladd Erickson, Mclean Cnty. State’s Attorney (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Amy J. Hornbacher
Mclean Cnty. Letter] (on file with author).
181. Amy J. Hornbacher Burleigh Cnty. Letter, supra note 180.
182. Id.
183. Telephone Interview with Sergeant Jason Stugelmeyer, Bismarck Police Dep’t (Dec. 10,
2012).
184. Id.
185. Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, Assistant Ward Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec.
10, 2012).
186. E-mail from Kathleen K. Trosen, Wells Cnty. State’s Attorney to Cherie L. Clark, Asst.
Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 4, 2012) (on file with author).
187. Telephone Interview with Marie A. Roller, McHenry Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 11,
2012).
188. Interview with Tristan J. Van de Streek, supra note 179. Cass County is particularly
concerned because Sanford is one of its two major providers. Id.
189. See generally Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, supra note 185. A main issue
in Ward County is understaffing at Trinity Hospital in Minot, N.D. Id.
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coordinating nurses to testify at trial has been difficult.190 This is
sometimes exacerbated by the nature of many DUIs – committed at night
by drivers who are taken to night-shift blood drawers.191 Others add that
the “cyclical hiring process and the transitory nature of the workforce,”
especially in oil-impacted areas, make producing the nurse for trial very
burdensome.192
E. OPTIONS TO REDUCE COSTS
Prosecutors must deal with the costs associated with the existing Rule.
One option is to seek another amendment of the Rule. It could be changed
to eliminate the state’s requirement to produce the nurse for trial. This
would allow the prosecutor to prove through a law enforcement officer or
other witness that a blood sample was properly obtained. But convincing
the North Dakota Supreme Court to change the Rule back to a version like
its original form may be difficult.193
Another option is to seek amendment of North Dakota Century Code
section 39-20-07. Like the Rule, the statute could be changed to eliminate
the state’s requirement to produce the nurse for trial. That is because the
court has construed the Rule in light of the statute.194 Subdivision 10 of the
statute is the real trigger for the requirement to produce the nurse under the
Rule.195 As noted, the court has interpreted North Dakota Century Code
section 39-20-07(10) as establishing the nurse’s statement as a prerequisite
to admission of the blood test result under chapter 39-20.196 So the statute
could be changed to explicitly provide (1) that the nurse’s statement is not a
prerequisite, and (2) that another witness can establish that a blood sample
was properly drawn. Then the court’s interpretation would have to change.
Still another option is for a prosecutor to not use the shortcut procedure
in North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07 and thus not be subject to
Rule 707.197 The Rule applies when a prosecutor intends to introduce an
190. Interview with Tristan J. Van de Streek, supra note 179.
191. Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, supra note 185.
192. E-mail from Aaron W. Roseland, Adams Cnty. State’s Attorney to Cherie L. Clark,
Assistant Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 4, 2012) (on file with author); see also Telephone
Interview with Marie A. Roller, supra note 187 (indicating that several crimes – including DUI –
have increased significantly since the oil boom). Roseland, who was the petitioner in Herauf,
points to that case as a prime example; the nurse who did the blood draw had moved before trial to
Texas. E-mail from Aaron W. Roseland, supra.
193. See infra discussion Part IV.
194. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 11, 819 N.W.2d 546, 551.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Some might suggest that law enforcement could just stop seeking blood tests and rely
on breath tests. But that does not produce an acceptable outcome. Blood tests generally are
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analytical report “issued under . . . N.D.C.C. chapter[] 39-20[.]”198 So
presumably the prosecutor could forgo serving notice199 under the Rule,
forgo offering Form 104,200 and choose to simply offer at trial the officer’s
testimony to establish the authenticity of a blood sample sent for testing and
an expert’s testimony to establish the accuracy of the blood testing done.
Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if the
approved method is not followed, the state can present expert testimony to
show the test was fairly administered.201 In such instances, the analytical
report is not “issued202 under” North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20.
Nothing in that chapter is relied upon for admission of the report. Instead,
general evidentiary rules are followed.
In addition, an option is to contemplate a process under which private
hospital nurses are not the persons drawing blood and the prosecutor and
hospital thus are not competing against each other. Morton County serves
as one example. In Morton County, a registered nurse has an independent
contract with the county to provide blood draw services. Similarly, in
Bismarck, sexual assault nurse examiners on contract with the city have
been handling blood draws.203 Finally, in Cass County, the sheriff is
considering a process whereby medically qualified persons – possibly

preferred over breath tests because breath test results are more often challenged by defendants,
regardless of merit. Telephone Interview with Sean B. Kasson, supra note 185; Telephone
Interview with Kristjan Helgoe, Trooper, N.D. State Highway Patrol (Dec. 11, 2012). Moreover,
some DUI arrestees are incapable of producing a sufficient breath sample for testing. E-mail from
Kathleen K. Trosen, supra note 186.
198. N.D. R. EVID. 707(a).
199. If a prosecutor serves notice and the defendant demands production of the nurse, the
prosecutor should consider withdrawing the notice.
200. As noted, Form 104 includes statements (testimony) from the nurse and the specimen
receiver at the state lab.
201. See City of W. Fargo v. Hawkins, 2000 ND 168, ¶ 17, 616 N.W.2d 856, 860; State v.
Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 882 (N.D. 1993); City of Grand Forks v. Soli, 479 N.W.2d 872, 875
(N.D. 1992); State v. Nodland, 493 N.W.2d 697, 699 (N.D. 1992); State v. Sivesind, 439 N.W.2d
530, 533 (N.D. 1989); State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 324 (N.D. 1988); Moser v. N.D. State
Highway Comm’r, 369 N.W.2d 650, 653 (N.D. 1985).
202. “Issued” seems to be a misnomer. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (6th ed. 1991)
(defining “issue” as “[t]o send forth; to emit; to promulgate”). The analytical report is issued by
the state crime laboratory’s analyst and is based on the testing completed at the lab. The
prosecutor can choose to offer the report under North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20, but the
report is not issued under the chapter.
203. Telephone Interview with Sergeant Jason Stugelmeyer, supra note 183. This may be a
temporary fix and could be problematic when there are several DUIs or several DUIs and sexual
assaults during one period.
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cross-trained employees204 or independent contractors – would provide
blood draw services.205
VI. CONCLUSION
Melendez-Diaz and its progeny are tricky.206 Justice Kennedy aptly
explained, “without guidance from an established body of law, the States
can only guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse
constitutional text [of the Confrontation Clause].”207
Herauf and its interpretation of Rule 707 exemplify the problems
stemming from Melendez-Diaz. When Rule 707 was adopted, no one
envisioned it as establishing that a blood-drawing nurse is a necessary
witness in a DUI prosecution.208 And at adoption, it did not do so.209
Indeed, the originally-adopted rule stemmed from Melendez-Diaz and
targeted lab analysts.210 “The concept outlined by the United States
Supreme Court and already practiced in numerous states was to provide
defendants the ability to assert their right to confront the makers of reports
that ultimately would be used to implicate them in criminal activity.”211
Yet the Rule evolved, and now the nurse has become a necessary
witness.212 As Rule 707 has evolved, so too have DUI prosecutions. The
former shortcut (North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-07) has become
the long way.213 Indeed, the costs of producing nurses for trials are great –
for both prosecutors and hospitals.214 Beyond seeking statutory or rule
changes, prosecutors should consider either avoiding the Rule by forgoing
the “shortcut” procedure under North Dakota Century Code chapter 39-20
or implementing a process that does not use private hospital employees for
blood draws.215 The bottom line is that prosecutors must respond.

204. Drawbacks of using cross-trained employees include (1) the significant impact on the
Sheriff’s operations and (2) the time needed to implement the system. E-mail from Paul Laney,
Cass Cnty. Sheriff, to Reid Brady, Assistant Cass Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 10, 2012).
205. Id.
206. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5.
209. N.D. R. EVID. 707 (2010).
210. Order of Adoption No. 20090381, supra note 5.
211. E-mail from Aaron G. Birst, N.D Ass’n of Cntys, to Cherie L. Clark, Assistant Cass
Cnty. State’s Attorney (Dec. 10, 2012) (on file with author). Moreover, the Rule still today
provides that if the defendant does not timely object, “the defendant’s right to confront the person
who prepared the report is waived.” N.D. R. EVID. 707(c).
212. State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 1, 819 N.W.2d 546, 548.
213. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
214. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
215. See discussion supra Part IV.E.

